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REGULATORY EXPOSURE OF DECEPTIVE MARKETING AND ITS IMPACT ON FIRM VALUE 
 
ABSTRACT 
Research linking marketing to financial performance has predominantly focused on how marketing 
assets and actions add value. We argue that it is equally important to understand how marketing decisions can 
destroy firm value. Prior research has indicated that negative events vary greatly in their indirect costs to the 
firm. Based on established theory and in-depth interviews with practitioners, we identify a set of factors that 
can explain the heterogeneity in the magnitude of indirect costs associated with negative marketing-related 
events. Specifically, we address how shareholder value is impacted by the regulatory exposure of deceptive 
marketing, which carries no direct cost to the firm. Using an event study, our analysis shows that incidents of 
exposed deceptive marketing are associated with significant negative abnormal returns amounting to a drop of 
1%, which translates into an $86M wealth loss for the median-sized firm in our sample. In explaining the 
variation in magnitude of the impact between events, we find that event characteristics are generally more 
significant than firm and brand characteristics. When deception is highly egregious or directed at vulnerable 
populations, firm value is more negatively impacted than when the potential to mislead and harm is not readily 
verifiable. Furthermore, when the cited product has substantial brand market share, the levels of 
egregiousness and target audience explain substantially more of the variation in event impact than when brand 
market share is low. The results are robust to alternative stock portfolio-based measures of abnormal returns, 
model specification, heteroskedasticity, and examination of risk. Our framework and analysis have implications 
for Wall Street executives, Main Street managers, academic researchers, and public policy.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Following the challenge outlined by Srivastava, Shervani, and Fahey (1998) and subsequent criticism 
by Rust et al. (2004), a growing number of empirical studies have examined the marketing-finance interface. 
Studies have explored the financial market impact of brand asset perceptions (Mizik and Jacobson 2008), 
product quality (e.g., Tellis and Johnson 2007), corporate reputation (Roberts and Dowling 2002), and product 
innovation (Srinivasan et al. 2009). Researchers in this area have predominantly focused on how marketing 
assets and actions add to financial performance and shareholder value. We argue, however, that it is equally 
important to understand how marketing decisions can reduce firm value. It has been well-established that 
negative information and events often have a greater salience than positive ones (e.g. Mahajan, Muller, and 
Kerin 1984; Van Heerde, Helsen and DeKimpe 2007; Lei, Dawar and Lemmik 2008), and we contend that 
understanding this effect requires the consideration of a different set of factors than those considered in value-
building studies.  
Researchers have found that negative events, such as product recalls (Davidson and Worrell 1992) 
and drug withdrawals (Ahmed, Gardella, and Nanda 2002) can influence stock market value. However, little is 
understood regarding the indirect costs associated with these negative events. Jarrell and Peltzman (1985) 
and Karpoff, Lee, and Martin (2008), among others, find that the financial impact of negative events can be far 
greater than the direct costs (e.g., fines, restocking fees) associated with the event. Additionally, the indirect 
costs associated with the event can vary greatly between events. Prior researchers have been unable to 
determine what factors account for the variation in indirect costs. Understanding these costs is critical because 
indirect costs of negative events can amount to a significant proportion of a firm‟s market valuation. 
Furthermore, many negative marketing-related events, such as when a firm is exposed for using deceptive 
marketing, have no immediate impact on cash flows but garner a quick investor response. Investors adjust 
their valuation of a stock based on expected cash flows to the firm (Srivastava, Shervani, and Fahey 1998).  
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This study examines what indirect costs of negative events prompt investors to change their cash flow 
expectation for the firm.  
In particular, the subject of our analysis is the investor reaction to the exposure of deceptive 
marketing. Deceptive marketing has received surprisingly little consideration from academic researchers 
despite the frequency of its use and the intensity of attention it receives from regulatory agencies and the 
popular press (Darke, Ashworth, and Ritchie 2008). Behavioral studies have found that deception engenders 
distrust (Darke and Ritchie 2007) and leads to avoidance of the perpetrator (Wang, Galinsky, and Murnighan 
2009. However, the effect on firm valuation has not been measured. This is important because maximizing 
shareholder value is a principal concern of public firms (Srivastava, Shervani, and Fahey 1998) and 
understating the value impact of such actions would inform managers of the potential downsides of such 
actions. 
Prior studies concerning value-reducing events have concentrated on firm and environmental 
characteristics and have not explained a significant proportion of the variation in indirect cost between events. 
We take a different approach by considering the characteristics of the events. In fact, in research examining 
value-creating activities, it is not uncommon for researchers to consider characteristics of the action when 
explaining the magnitude of change in market capitalization (e.g., Tellis and Johnson 2007). In the context of 
deceptive marketing, the event characteristics that vary between occurrences are the type of violation, the 
severity of the deceptive information, the target audience, and the marketing communication medium.  
In developing a theoretical framework for understanding the impact of these factors, we rely on 
established theory and in-depth interviews with market analysts. Our theory begins with the expectation that 
following the exposure of deceptive marketing, subsequent trading will quickly change the market capitalization 
of the firm to reflect the change in cash flows to the firm expected as a result of this event (Srivasan and 
Hanssens 2009). Investors consider how public awareness of a firm‟s deceptive activity will lower cash flows 
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through increasing costs and decreasing revenues. As one market analyst explained, “When we find out about 
safety issues, we immediately (within 3-24 hours) issue a research report and reduce our revenue forecast 
from X to X minus something.” This estimate is based on how the event will alter the behavior of relevant 
stakeholders (i.e., physicians, past and present consumers, competitors, state and federal governments, and 
shareholders) and the resulting implications for the firm‟s future cash flow.  
To measure the aggregate financial impact of these events, we used an event study to calculate 
abnormal stock market returns, which, according to the efficient market hypotheses, provides an unbiased 
estimate of changes to future cash flow that can be attributed to a single event (Fama 1970).This analysis 
shows that, overall, incidents of exposed deceptive marketing are associated with significant negative 
abnormal returns.1 In the second part of our analysis, we look at the factors that explain the variation in 
abnormal returns between events. We find that event characteristics are critical in understanding the 
heterogeneity of the financial market reaction and the resultant shareholder impact. Activities with high 
aggregate stakeholder costs (i.e., promotions directed at consumers, and highly egregious, unsubstantiated 
effectiveness claims) are associated with negative abnormal returns, while deceptive activities with lower total 
costs, namely unsubstantiated superiority claims and direct-to-consumer print advertising, are not. We also 
find moderating effects for brand market share and advertising spending that are consistent with our theory of 
stakeholder cost. Our framework and analysis have implications for Wall Street executives and Main Street 
managers, academic researchers and public policy.  
CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND 
Deceptive Marketing In The Pharmaceutical Industry 
Several factors make the pharmaceutical industry especially conducive and relevant to marketing 
                                                 
1 The focus of the study is on heterogeneity in the financial market impact of regulatory exposure of deceptive 
marketing. We do not assess the overall impact of deceptive marketing (i.e. from its initiation to the exposure period). 
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research. An absence of blockbuster drugs has shifted the focus of the industry from research to marketing 
(Angell 2004). The drug industry association, PhRMA, argues that spending on R&D still outpaces promotional 
spending (Egan 2004). However, critics, including academic researchers and members of Congress, contend 
that standard measures of promotion, such as IMS data, exclude significant costs and rely on surveys of the 
pharmaceutical firms themselves, which have incentives to underestimate marketing spending (Gagnon and 
Lexchin 2008). Some researchers estimate pharmaceutical firms spend significantly more on marketing 
promotions than R&D (Angell 2004). Yet, even the conservative, self-reported measures show pharmaceutical 
promotion totaling $29.9 billion in 2005 and growing at an average annual rate of 10.6% since 1996 (Donohue, 
Cevasco, and Rosenthal 2007). Since the FDA loosened regulations governing direct-to-consumer (DTC) 
marketing in 1997, pharmaceuticals have increased DTC expenditures at an average rate of 14.3%. Merck‟s 
DTC promotional spending on Vioxx in 2000, for example, even exceeded that spent by Budweiser and Pepsi 
(Macilwain 2005). 
Instances of deceptive marketing continue among drug companies, despite the fact that the 
pharmaceutical industry has arguably the strongest guidelines concerning marketing practices of any industry. 
Pharmaceutical marketing is regulated by the FDA‟s Division of Drug Marketing and Communications 
(DDMAC).  Firms found to mislead consumers or physicians in their drug promotions are issued citation letters 
that cite firms for one or more of three major violations: unsubstantiated effectiveness claims, omitting risk 
information, and unsubstantiated superiority claims. Tables 1 and the appendix provide, respectively, technical 
definitions and measures of egregiousness related to the violations. 
[Table 1 About Here] 
The FDA letters are made publicly available on its website. They frequently receive abundant attention 
from the media, including high-circulation newspapers such as The Wall Street Journal and The Los Angeles 
Times (Darke, Ashworth, and Ritchie 2008). Additionally, the cited violations have received attention from 
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many popular consumer interest groups, such as the Consumers Union and the United States Public Interest 
Research Group (PIRG), as well as many of the individual state PIRGs. As a result of the negative publicity, 
many stakeholders (e.g. physicians, market analysts) are aware of these violations (Darke, Ashworth,  and 
Ritchie 2008; Tyebjee 1982). The significance of this public awareness to investors (and thus to firms) is 
discussed in the following section. 
Theoretical Framework 
Previous research on the reduction of firm value has involved events with large direct costs to the firm. 
In business, psychology and economics literature, researchers have examined the overall financial impact of 
events such as financial misrepresentation (Karpoff, Lee and Martin 2008) and restatement announcements 
(Palmrose, Richardson, and Scholz 2004). The empirical research indicates that a sizable gap usually exists 
between estimates of direct costs and the magnitude of the capital losses due to recalls. Jarrell and Peltzman 
(1985) attribute these losses to a general and unspecified decline in goodwill surrounding the firm. For 
citations of deceptive marketing, the event carries no direct costs such as fines or corrective advertising 
requirements. Therefore, to begin a comprehensive analysis of the impact of deceptive marketing on stock 
return, we look at what makes up the previously undefined “loss of goodwill.”  
Based on in-depth interviews of market analysts2, these citations do, in fact, change earnings 
estimates. The citations are described as “stirring up a lot of anxiety” due to the new information they provide, 
and they may be followed by an immediate change in revenue and cost forecasts. As one analyst explained, 
“we continuously track the FDA warnings and continuously update the impact of the warnings on the firm itself 
and on competitors. This is reflected in our quarterly reports.”  To add additional support for this argument, we 
conducted some exploratory analysis of analyst reaction to FDA warning letters. Using the Institutional 
                                                 
2 We conducted in-depth interviews with six senior financial analysts, four of whom belonged to large Wall Street firms 
and two who belonged to boutique firms.  In addition we also conducted in-depth interviews with two senior 
pharmaceutical firm executives. Each interview lasted between 25-40 minutes.  
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Brokers‟ Estimate System (I/B/E/S) database we examined if analysts changed their earnings estimates within 
five days of the posting of the FDA warning letter. The average percentage reduction in forecasted earnings 
was significantly different from the average increase in forecasted earnings (p<0.05).  While not conclusive, 
this finding provides further preliminary evidence that financial analysts do react to the FDA warning letters. 
With any marketing action, investors outlook is influenced by how the action will increase or decrease 
cash flows (Srinivasan et al. 2009). In the case of citations for deceptive marketing, firm valuation may be 
impacted by investor estimates of subsequent increased costs (through greater legal liability and lower 
marketing elasticity3) and decreased revenue (through fewer prescriptions and sales). Relying on the 
assumption of market efficiency, we argue that these unanticipated changes to the firm‟s future cash flows are 
reflected in abnormal stock market returns (Fama 1970).  
Prior theory and interviews with market analysts indicate that the impact of the characteristics will vary 
according to the severity or egregiousness of the act. In the marketing literature, an action‟s egregiousness is 
determined by the degree of deception involved and how critical the information concealed is considered 
(Klein, Smith, and John 2004). In their study of consumer response to negative publicity, Ahluwalia, Burnkrant, 
and Unnava (2000) explain that their analysis is limited in not considering extreme or life-threatening 
consequences. They call attention to research indicating that, generally, more severe consequences are 
weighted more heavily in the evaluation of information (Fiske 1980; Fich and Shivdasani 2007).  
The FDA citations distinguish between three major types of violations: omitted risk information, 
unsubstantiated effectiveness claims, and unsubstantiated superiority claims. The letters also contain 
information on the audience and type of media used. For each characteristic of the deceptive act, we identify 
the cost and revenue implications that are considered by analysts and investors when calculating changes to 
                                                 
3 Marketing elasticity refers to the percent change in sales with respect to percent change in spending on marketing 
activities. 
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future cash flows.  
HYPOTHESES 
Omitted Risk Information 
For violations involving omissions of risk information, the perceived egregiousness of the act is quite 
different when the false information concerns the possibility of nausea than when it relates to the drug‟s 
possibly fatal side-effects. When severe risk information is omitted, stakeholders may assume that the level of 
risk does not outweigh the benefits of the drug. In other words, consumers may suffer fatal or life-altering side 
effects as a result of a treatment they would not have pursued if aware of the true risks. The case of Merck‟s 
arthritis drug, Vioxx, is one of the most prominent examples of egregious omission of risk information. The 
FDA sent Merck multiple letters concerning the omission of life-threatening cardiovascular risks in its Vioxx 
promotions. While many safer treatments to arthritis existed, thousands of consumers took a potentially 
dangerous drug under questionable pretenses (Topol 2004). This is not surprising, since experimental 
research finds that pharmaceutical marketing leads to a boomerang effect (i.e., undermining the patients‟ 
intentions to engage in health-protective behavior (Bolton et al. 2008)). The outrage following the exposure of 
Merck‟s omission of risk information spurred a multitude of class action lawsuits and hundreds of articles 
calling for a review of pharmaceutical marketing.  
Highly egregious acts impact several groups of stakeholders. The aggregate impact of changes in 
behavior by these groups is figured into calculations of the financial impact of the event.  
Physicians: When risk information is omitted in a promotion, physicians must worry about protecting 
themselves against malpractice suits in addition to suboptimal patient treatment.  According to the Learned 
Intermediary Rule, physicians are responsible for warning consumers of the dangers associated with the drug 
regardless of the information conveyed in DTC advertising (Hill 2005). Therefore, when the deception involves 
highly egregious omissions of risk information, the potential for patient harm is higher and more physicians will 
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seek alternative treatments to minimize their own liability. Fewer prescriptions will decrease the firm‟s expected 
revenue from sales of the drug. 
In addition to impairing future revenues, exposure of deceptive marketing that involves severe risk 
consequences will negatively impact the response or returns to the marketing actions (i.e., marketing elasticity) 
of the firms. Highly egregious violations will command the attention of physicians because of the potential risk 
of malpractice suits, and deception will engender distrust (Darke and Ritchie 2007). Physicians will be less 
receptive to future attempts at persuasion when they distrust the firm (Ortmann and Hertwig 2002). Cited 
pharmaceuticals will subsequently have lower returns on their marketing efforts. In addition to difficulty 
regarding promotional efforts, physicians will be more wary of information originating from the firm and will tend 
to distrust the clinical trials conducted by the offending firm. As a result, firms will have to spend more on 
marketing activities to achieve the same returns as before the event.  In summary, subsequent to the exposure 
of deceptive marketing, costs to physicians will induce behavior that adversely affects the firm‟s future cash 
flow by both decreasing revenue and increasing future marketing and sales costs.  
Past Consumers: Consumers who were misled by the cited pharmaceutical firm may take legal action 
against it if the omitted risk information led to severe harm. If the consequences to consumers of using the 
firm‟s product are minimal, most consumers will not be able to make a strong legal case. Omissions of risk 
information judged to be at the lowest levels of egregiousness involve a lack of fair balance. The FDA does not 
give a clear definition of fair balance, and, as a result, these claims are difficult to prove in court. However, if 
the total physical or financial harm caused by the deception is high, the potential litigation from misleading 
consumers could translate into enormous financial burdens for the firm. According to one analyst, “Any time it 
could be a safety issue it is a problem. Litigation based on safety concerns seems to hit traction with juries.” 
Misleading marketing practices have previously resulted in multi-million dollar fines and class action lawsuit 
settlements. In 2008, as a result of concealing information about fatal side effects associated with its arthritis 
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drug Vioxx, Merck was ordered to pay claimants $4.85 billion, the largest settlement in pharmaceutical history. 
Potential Customers: Patients are no longer limited in their power to choose not to refill a prescription 
but can also control the brands they are prescribed. As articulated by the American College of Physicians, “the 
current wave of direct-to-consumer advertising is putting patients in the diagnostic driver‟s seat” (Maguire 
1999). As a result, consumers can reduce firm revenues by changing their physicians‟ prescribing behavior as 
well as their own purchasing patterns. When a cited marketing action for a drug involves highly egregious 
omitted risk information, potential customers will seek alternative treatments out of fear for their health. While 
the benefit-to-risk ratio may still objectively be favorable, consumers have a tendency to overweigh negative 
information, especially when they mistrust the firm (Sorescu and Gelb 2000). Therefore, citations for highly 
egregious acts of deception will impair drug revenues.  
Furthermore, as with physicians, consumers will be less receptive to future attempts at persuasion 
following the exposure of deceptive marketing. Consistent with this expectation, a recent case study using a 
VAR approach of a product-harm crisis (salmonella poisoning of peanut butter) found that it led to quadruple 
jeopardy of a loss of baseline sales, reduced own price increased cross-price elasticities, and reduced 
marketing instrument effectiveness (Van Heerde, Helsen and Dekimpe 2007). The cited firms will thus need to 
engage in more costly marketing activities to achieve the same returns as those prior to the violation.  
Competitors: Any statement that makes a drug appear to be better than it is or better than its 
substitutes may draw sales from its direct competitors. Under the Lanham Act, firms can sue competitors for 
deceptive advertising. However, the plaintiff must be able to prove that the claims are false and that 
consumers were deceived by the information. According to the courts, implied falsity, which is analogous to 
lack of fair balance or low egregiousness, must be proved via consumer survey which is not often a viable 
option (Manning and McKenna 2002). Therefore, an outright omission of risk information with clear and 
egregious consequences is easier to prove and more likely to be taken to court. The Lanham Act allows for 
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monetary damages to be recovered from the misleading firm and thus negatively affect its future cash flows.  
Government: State and federal agencies also heavily penalize firms to fund consumer protection 
education programs and to cover the increasing costs of treating harmed consumers.  
In summary, following an FDA citation, highly egregious omissions of risk information will translate into 
reduced estimates of cash flows due to decreasing future sales and increasing marketing costs and legal 
liability.  In accordance with the efficient market hypothesis, a decrease in estimates of future cash flows will 
be reflected in negative abnormal stock returns (Brown and Warner 1985). Therefore, we hypothesize:  
H1:  The egregiousness of the omitted risk information cited will be negatively associated with 
abnormal stock returns. 
 
Unsubstantiated Effectiveness claims 
Similar to omitted risk information, highly egregious unsubstantiated effectiveness claims can lead to 
suboptimal prescribing decisions as consumers may take on high levels of risk for little benefit or for less 
benefit than would be gained from an alternate treatment.The potential negative word-of-mouth from 
disappointed patients in the current environment of blogs and online forums is likely to be significant. The 
subsequent negative stock market reaction in the airline industry illustrates the impact of negative voice (Luo 
2007). Since patients are likely to be more involved with pharmaceutical products than airlines, negative voice 
should lead to a significant reduction in future cash streams for firms that are cited for the use of 
unsubstantiated efficacy claims. Investors are also concerned with the reaction of physicians: “When there are 
marketing malpractices in the area of use of the drug that is for a particular indication, and if the ads suggest 
that it could be for other indications, physicians will definitely react.”  In the case of Schering Plough and Merck 
(the JV partners that make Vyotorin and Zetia), prescriptions fell dramatically and shares plunged 46% and 
35% respectively following the exposure of their unsupported claims (Rubenstein and Winslow 2008). 
Additionally, unsubstantiated effectiveness claims leave firms vulnerable to legal action by government 
agencies seeking reimbursement for unnecessary or ineffective medications paid for by programs such as 
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Medicaid. Following false statements regarding the effectiveness of Synthroid, Knoll Pharmaceuticals signed a 
$41.8 million settlement (Department of Justice 1999). More recently, Pfizer agreed to pay $430 million to 
federal and state agencies for off-label marketing tactics (Harris 2004). Given the totality of the impact of 
egregious unsubstantiated effectiveness claims on cash flow, we hypothesize: 
H2:  The egregiousness of the unsubstantiated effectiveness claims/broadening of indications cited 
will be negatively associated with abnormal stock returns. 
 
Unsubstantiated Superiority Claims 
Unsubstantiated superiority claims make unproven claims about the inferiority or unpopularity of 
competing drugs. Since it is usually prohibitively costly and complicated for firms or regulatory agencies to 
conduct comparative brand studies, stakeholders are unable to assess whether these violations actually lead 
to harm or suboptimal prescribing decisions (Gottlieb 2007). Thus, we argue that violations of unsubstantiated 
superiority claims are unlikely to lead to litigation or changes in prescribing behavior. The exposure of this type 
of deception could still lead to a reduction in marketing elasticity. However, the lack of severity in the violation 
is not likely to draw enough attention to significantly alter behavior and cash flows. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
H3:  Unsubstantiated superiority claims will be associated with abnormal stock returns. The 
direction of the effect is an empirical issue. 
 
Target Audience 
Another factor of the FDA violations, the intended audience of the advertisement, also affects the 
costs stemming from the event. Whether the campaign is directed at consumers or health care professionals 
influences the probability that the act will cause harm (i.e., the egregiousness of the act). Reasoning that 
health care professionals are better able to detect deceptive claims and avoid being misled by vague language 
than consumers are, DTC advertising will be more likely to result in deception (Mizik and Jacobson 2004).  
While physicians make the ultimate prescription decision, patients increasingly pressure their 
physicians to prescribe specific drugs (Aikin 2003; Menon et al. 2004), and physicians have strong financial 
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incentives to respond to their requests or else risk losing them as patients (Gönül, Carter, and Wind 2000). 
The published physician surveys and secondary data studies offer inconclusive evidence about the extent of 
patient influence on prescribing, but experimental evidence shows patients have a powerful effect on 
physicians‟ prescribing practices (Gellad and Lyles 2007). In an experiment conducted by Kravitz et al. (2005), 
stealth patients making unannounced visits to physicians were prescribed drugs far more often when they 
requested them, even when the indications were questionable. Therefore, because DTC violations may 
mislead more of the individuals involved in the prescription choice decision, more total harm will result from 
violations and thus increase the possibility of future legal actions against the firm. 
In a few jurisdictions, courts have begun expanding the liability of drug manufacturers concerning DTC 
advertising. Based on state consumer protection statutes, some courts have agreed that DTC advertising 
empowers consumers and nullifies the protection afforded to drug manufacturers via the Learned Intermediary 
Doctrine (Graham and Vest 2005). The penalties under these state consumer protection statutes are 
substantially higher than the common law claims to which they were subject previously. The costs to the 
manufacturer from state consumer protection statutes also lead us to hypothesize: 
H4:  Citations for direct-to-consumer marketing will be more negatively associated with abnormal 
stock returns than when the cited marketing is directed towards physicians. 
 
Media Type 
Previous research has specified that the types of media used can influence the effectiveness of 
advertising and moral judgments (Morris et al. 1986). Although we do not provide a directional hypothesis for 
print, we expect that the use of television will be negatively associated with abnormal stock returns. The 
difference in effect can be attributed to the ability of advertisements in these media channels to mislead 
consumers, the number of consumers exposed to the message, and the vulnerability of those exposed.  
Researchers have found that consumers are more likely to miscomprehend televised drug 
advertisements than those from other media sources (Morris et al. 1986). The finding may be due to the 
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different guidelines for broadcast drug advertising set forth by the FDA. The rules for broadcast media 
advertising are appreciably more lenient than for other forms of communications and allow firms to simplify 
their messages (Coleman, Hartley, and Kennamer 2006). Often benefits are put in lay terms or portrayed 
visually, while competing sounds and visuals may be displayed during the disclosure of risk information. These 
factors have been shown to increase brand recall and positive associations (Callcott and Phillips 1996). 
Additionally, some critics argue that emotional appeals, which are more frequently used in television than in 
print, target the populations most vulnerable to persuasion (Macias, Pashupati, and Lewis 2007).   
Because televised ads are likely to mislead viewers and thus lead to suboptimal health care, the firm 
has a greater chance of being the target of costly class action and government lawsuits.  Therefore, we expect 
shareholders to pull out of their positions in the cited firm and abnormal returns of the stock to follow.  
H5A:  Citations for television communications will be negatively associated with abnormal stock 
returns. 
 
Print advertising covers a broad range of communication including brochures, magazine spreads, and 
tradeshow displays. Print communications are required by the FDA to include a brief summary of all risk and 
side effects as opposed to only the major risks required of broadcast ads. We do not argue a directional 
hypothesis for print communication as competing arguments exist about the persuasiveness of this medium.  
Print is generally considered to be more informative and credible than other forms of advertising (e.g., 
Macias, Pashupati and Lewis 2007). Moreover, print media has been found to have a stronger transformative 
impact on affect and product attitudes than television (Bronner and Neijens 2006). Accordingly, it could be 
argued that misleading information in print advertisements is likely to be believed and lead to suboptimal 
patient care or harm. As a result, stakeholders will change their behavior in ways that will reduce future cash 
flows (e.g., filing law suits or prescribing the drug less often). 
 However, the technical language of these advertisements may make them ineffective. A recent study 
finds that the great majority of Americans are unable to understand the risk and benefit language of print 
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advertisements for drugs, and frustrated consumers ignore the information in such advertisements altogether 
(Sheehan 2007) As for physicians, the print medium allows them to process the information at an optimal 
pace. According to Darley and Smith (1993), print reduces agreement to non-credible messages because an 
expert audience is able to consider the difficult points and elaborate at will. If print advertising is ineffective and 
unable to deceive consumers or physicians, resulting harm will be minimal and estimates of future cash flow 
will not be affected. Given these competing arguments: 
H5b:  Citations for print communications will be associated with abnormal stock returns. The 
direction of the hypothesis is an empirical issue. 
 
The remaining media category, labeled “other media,” includes primarily campaigns using mixed 
media, as well as, radio and detailing promotions. Because this category included a diverse group of 
promotion types, we did not put forth a hypothesis for these alternative types of communication.   
Brand Market Share 
The brand‟s market share does not impact stakeholders in any way not anticipated by investors and 
should not have a direct impact on abnormal stock returns following the exposure of deception. However, the 
level of brand market share will affect the relationship between the issue-contingent factors and market 
valuation. We argue that low brand market share of a cited product will reduce the impact on cash flow of the 
event characteristics. When market share of the brand is low, the majority of investors do not have prior 
knowledge of the brand or the extent to which stakeholders are likely to change their purchasing behavior or 
take legal actions. Therefore, we argue that investors are unlikely to have different estimates of future cash 
flow based on the egregiousness of the act or the target audience when brand share is low. On the other hand, 
when the brand market share of the cited product is high, the brand is salient and investors are better able to 
distinguish between the impact of different types of deception. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
H6A:  Egregiousness of omitted risk information will have a stronger negative association with 
abnormal stock returns when brand market share is high than when brand market share is 
low.  
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H6B:  Egregiousness of unsubstantiated effectiveness claims will have  a stronger negative 
association with abnormal stock returns when brand market share is high than when brand 
market share is low. 
H6C:   Target audience will have a more negative association with abnormal stock returns when 
brand market share is high than when brand market share is low. 
 
Controls and Moderators 
We control for previous firm citations, market dependence, brand sales and advertising spending, 
each of which may affect negative abnormal returns. Previous citations sent to the firm may dull the negative 
impact of subsequent FDA citations. When a firm has been cited numerous times for marketing violations, its 
inclination towards illegal or deceptive activities will be taken into account in the firm value. Davidson and 
Worrell (1992) found that recalls in the automotive industry occur so often that the impact of a specific 
announcement has little or no effect. It can be argued that reductions in cash flow related to deceptive 
marketing will already be included in the stock evaluation. Brand sales of firms have been found to explain a 
significant amount of variance in the ability of firms to react to costly events (Moorman, Du, and Mela 2005; 
Tellis and Johnson 2007) Advertising spending is included as a control in the main model because it is well 
established that the level of advertising spending has a significant positive impact on estimates of future cash 
flows and shareholder value (e.g., Bharadwaj, Bharadwaj, and Konsynski 1999; Osinga et al. 2008). 
Advertising spending is positively correlated with both perceived and objective quality (Moorthy and Zhao 
2000). Because advertising creates positive associations about a brand, investors may be more surprised by 
negative information about a brand with high advertising spending, and its stock price may fall. On the other 
hand, when positive associations are held about a brand, Ahluwalia, Burnkrant, and Unnava (2000) found the 
impact of negative information on attitudes is minimized, but, when a brand is unfamiliar, negative information 
is perceived as more diagnostic for the brand.  
METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
Research Methodology 
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The impact on the financial market of the deceptive marketing detailed in the FDA warning letters is 
assessed using an event study methodology. This approach has a long history in finance and accounting of 
capturing the impact of mergers and acquisitions, earnings, stock splits, and other changes. Marketing 
researchers exploring the link between marketing actions and financial market impact have increasingly 
adopted this method (Srinivasan and Bharadwaj 2004). While common in finance, studies examining the 
impact of negative events using the event study method are far less prevalent in marketing.   
The approach we have adopted follows theory and guidelines in the event study methodology literature 
(e.g., Brown and Warner 1985). This method assumes that changes in stock prices reflect information made 
newly available to investors. In this instance, the publicly available information about the FDA deceptive 
marketing violations is immediately incorporated to assess the impact of the FDA violations on either or both 
revenues and costs and, therefore, the future cash flow of the firm.  
 To assess the event‟s impact on the firm‟s shareholder value, we use the Fama-French-momentum four-
factor model, which is also referred to as the Carhart model, to assess the change in the stock‟s price or the 
abnormal return (Fama and French 1996; Carhart 1997). The traditional market model estimates abnormal 
returns as the actual ex post return of the stock over the event window minus the expected normal return of 
the firm over the event window if the event did not take place. For each firm i and event date t: 
(1)      εit* = Rit – E[Rit | Xt ]       
where εit*, Rit and E(Rit) are the abnormal, actual, and normal returns, respectively, for the time period t. Xt is 
the conditioning information for the normal performance model for the stock. The Carhart approach 
incorporates four additional factors that can contribute to differences in stock returns: the size of the firm, the 
market-to-book ratio, the firm‟s risk class, and its momentum (Carhart 1997): 
(2)    εit = (Rit - Rrf,t) - αi - βi (Rmt - Rrf,t) - s i SMBt - h i HMLt - u i UMDt   
where, for firm i at time period t, εit is abnormal returns; Rit is actual returns; Rmt is returns for portfolio m; Rrf,t is 
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risk free returns; SMBt  , HMLt, UMDt control for differences in return due to size, tangible assets, and 
momentum, respectively. 
  As reported later, we use three broad-based indexes (S&P 500, NYSE, Nasdaq) and a pharmaceutical 
industry stock portfolio to proxy the market portfolio.  Removing the portion of the stock‟s return that is related 
to variations in the market‟s return decreases the variance of the abnormal return resulting in an increased 
ability to detect the effect of the event on the stock‟s returns. 
The market model was estimated with data from 250 trading days to 6 trading days prior to the event 
day. The event day was the day the FDA warning letter was posted on the FDA website, thus becoming public 
information. A two-day window was chosen to calculate the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) since some of 
the letters may have been posted late in the day on the FDA website, and, consequently, the financial market 
impact may occur only on the following trading day. Moreover, the two-day window calculating CARs is long 
enough to capture the significant impact of the event and also short enough to exclude confounding events. 
The cumulative abnormal return is calculated as follows:     
(3)      
Data 
Regulatory letters have been the subject of event studies across many disciplines. Statistically 
significant abnormal returns have recently been found for such events as automotive recalls (Davidson and 
Worrell 1992) and the announcement of drug withdrawals (Ahmed, Gardella and Nanda 2002). There is no 
reason to suppose that investors would be not anticipate these events while anticipating the publishing of the 
FDA letters. Pharmaceutical firms spend over $3 billion dollars a year on promotional activities. The varied and 
abundant promotion performed by pharmaceuticals make these activities as difficult or more difficult for 
investors to monitor than the activities of the firms in the cited studies. Therefore, we expect that deceptive 
marketing is not taken into account in security prices before the release of the FDA letter. 
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The population for our study is composed of all citation letters posted on the FDA website from the 
DDMAC. Our final sample was drawn using the following considerations. First, because the data is analyzed 
using the event study methodology, letters are included only if they are addressed to a publicly-traded 
pharmaceutical firm. Second, letters became available on the FDA website beginning in 1997, when 
pharmaceutical marketing regulations were loosened and DTC spending mushroomed (Huh and Langteau 
2007). However, the great majority of the letters from 1997 and 1998 were released on the same day as other 
letters. Multiple events occurring on the same day could have had confounding effects (Geyskens, Gielens, 
and Dekimpe 2002), so we excluded all observations from these years. Third, we also excluded letters if 
multiple brands were cited in one citation because many of the explanatory variables are specific to a single 
brand. Fourth, the event date used is the date the letter was made public, which is the day that it was posted 
on the FDA‟s website. We conducted a thorough search of The Wall Street Journal Index to identify whether 
information about the letter was leaked prior to the posted release date or if other firm-related events were 
reported at or around the time of the event (Lane and Jacobson 1995). If evidence of either issue was found, 
the event was excluded. Data on the other independent variables of interest was available for only 170 letters, 
which became our effective sample size. 
Measurement 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable, the financial impact of the deceptive marketing practices, was measured 
using the net present value (NPV) of the event for the following reason. Since CARs vary with firm size, larger 
firms tend to have smaller abnormal returns and smaller firms tend to have much larger abnormal returns 
(Anand and Khanna 2000). Net present value captures the total gains or losses of these events and alleviates 
the scaling problem faced otherwise (Kalaignanam, Shankar, and Varadarajan 2007). We computed the 
financial impact as the product of the CARs in the two day event window (0,+1) and the market capitalization of 
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the firm twenty days before the event (Chan et al 1997). We use the shortest significant window to minimize 
confounding effects. Stock market data were collected from CRSP, and factors particular to the Fama-French 
and Carhart approaches were collected from Professor Kenneth French‟s website.4   
Independent Variables 
The letters from the FDA may concern multiple promotional materials and multiple violations of varying 
degrees of severity. Either in the introductory paragraph or by subtitle, the letters identify clearly the violation(s) 
for which the firm is cited. Because unsubstantiated superiority claims do not vary in egregiousness, they were 
treated as a dummy variable, where “1” denotes that the violation was mentioned one or more times, and “0” 
indicates that no unsubstantiated superiority claims were made.  
The other two violations were coded according to their severity on a scale from zero to three, where 
zero indicates no violation. The egregiousness of unsubstantiated effectiveness claims and omission of risk 
information is determined by the level of deception and the criticality of the information concealed (see 
appendix). Characterizing drugs along these two dimensions is common in medical journals and business 
literature on deception (e.g., Andrews, Netemeyer, and Burton 1998; Markovitch, Steckel, and Yeung 2005). 
The level of deception refers to whether the violation involves a false statement versus a misleading 
implication. Ads containing only misleading implications include all of the required information but may present 
it unclearly or in such a way as to emphasize benefits over risk (Schwartz et al. 2009). The promotions that 
involve implicitly false claims are less likely impact future cash flows for two reasons. First, these types of 
violations are difficult to prove and are often rejected by courts as a basis of liability suits (Giliberti 2003). 
Second, without extrinsic evidence supporting the actual interpretation of the representation by viewers, 
stakeholders usually cannot determine whether the ad will cause harm (Yao and Vecchi 1992). Therefore, 
when the violation involves a misleading implication, the event is coded as “1” regardless of the criticality of the 
                                                 
4 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 
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information concealed.  
When the violation involves a false statement, it is considered more egregious, and the event is coded 
as “2” or “3” depending on the type of information concealed. According to the FDA, a serious adverse drug 
event is one that results in death, a birth defect, a disability, or a hospitalization. When a false claim relates to 
these types of serious harm, the event is considered extremely egregious and is coded “3”.  
One author and a research assistant independently coded the egregiousness of each unsubstantiated 
effectiveness claim and omitted risk violation. The reliability of the severity measures was assessed using the 
proportional reduction in loss (PRL) approach (Rust and Cooil 1994). This approach is identical to Perreault 
and Leigh‟s measure when two judges are used (Perreault and Leigh 1989). The PRL level for severity of 
unsubstantiated effectiveness and omission of risk information is .94 and .93, respectively. These PRL levels 
fall well above the generally accepted minimum level of .90 (Rust and Cooil 1994).  
The letter also identifies the intended audience. The DTC measure was treated as a dummy that takes 
the value “1” when all or part of the cited marketing efforts were directed at consumers and “0” when directed 
only at medical professionals. The type of media was treated as three dummy variables: print, where “1” 
indicates only print; television, where “1” indicates only broadcasts; and other media, where “1” indicates a 
combination of media or alternative promotions. In our sample, print accounts for roughly 65% of citations, 
while television and mixed/other accounts for about 17% each. 
Control Variables  
Previous violations were measured simply as a sum of all prior citations posted online, which includes 
all citations from March 1997 forward. To control for firm size, advertising spending was treated as a 
percentage of firm sales. Brand market share was calculated as the percentage of prescriptions within the 
treatment category. Annual measures of U.S. advertising spending and market share were obtained from 
Verispan, a market research firm that tracks marketing activity in the pharmaceutical industry. Data for firm 
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sales was collected from COMPUSTAT.  We include the measures corresponding to each year of the violation.  
RESULTS 
Table 2 presents the average abnormal returns for all letters in our sample posted on the FDA website 
on the event day as well as for several windows around the event. The results indicate that, on average, for 
the two day window (day “0” to “1”), firms that are cited on the FDA website for deceptive marketing practices 
experience a 1% drop in excess returns. The loss of 1% in excess returns translates into a wealth loss of $86 
million for the median firm in the sample. In contrast, marketing events with positive news average gains of 
0.42% across announcements of new product introductions (Chaney, Devinney, and Winer 1991), brand 
extensions (Lane and Jacobson 1995), celebrity endorsements (Agrawal and Kamakura 1995), product 
preannouncements (Sorescu, Shankar, and Kushwaha 2007), and new internet channel additions (Geyskens, 
Gielens, and Dekimpe 2002). The lack of significant abnormal returns before the event window suggests that 
there is no leakage or anticipation of information about the FDA warning letters (McWilliams and Siegel 1997). 
The cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) for longer windows after the event CAAR [1 to 5], CAAR[1 
to 20]  and CAAR[1, 100] are not significant. Following Gielens et al. (2008), we ran a pooled regression of the 
CARs against the time since the event date. This analysis indicates no drift in the results (p<0.10). The short 
event window and the insignificance of the subsequent drift are consistent with the efficient market assumption 
that is implicit in the method used in the study.  
[Table 2 About Here] 
Explaining the Heterogeneity in Abnormal Returns 
 While the market generally views the FDA warning letters as a negative signal and delivers negative 
stock returns overall, there is still significant heterogeneity around the returns.  Table 3 provides the results of 
the cross-sectional explanation of the variation in the observed stock-price reactions.  
[Table 3 About Here] 
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Omission of risk information has the anticipated negative effect (b=-0.26, p<0.001). Therefore, H1 is 
supported. H2 also finds support, since the effect of unsubstantiated effectiveness claims is also negative (b=-
0.20, p<0.05). While we had not developed a directional hypothesis for the effect of superiority claims, this 
violation has a positive but not significant association with abnormal returns (H3: p>0.05). Consistent with 
expectations, H4 is supported as DTC advertising has a significant negative effect (b=-0.27, p<0.001).   
Model 2 provides the results for hypotheses H5A and H5B.  For this analysis, we replaced the DTC 
variable with more specific measures that examine the effects of media type used. H5A is not supported 
(p>0.05), but the parameter estimate for TV is in the expected direction (b=-0.06).  Print DTC advertising, on 
the other hand, has a positive and significant effect on the net present value (b=0.13, p<0.05). Thus, H5B is 
supported. While we do not posit a directional hypothesis, other media has a negative and significant impact 
on net present value (b=-0.65, p<0.001). 
To test the moderator hypotheses, the sample was split on the median level of brand market share 
into two groups.  A z-test was used to assess the difference of coefficients between the two samples. For two 
coefficients βi and βj,  
(4)         
  
where the null hypothesis of equality of the coefficients follows a standard unit normal (Clogg, Petkova, and 
Haritou 1995). Under the assumption that the samples are independent, the standard error of the difference is 
equal to the square root of the sum of the two squared standard errors. Support is found for H6A-C since the 
negative effects of the omission of risk information, unsubstantiated efficacy claims, and DTC advertising are 
larger when the brand market share is high than when the brand market share is low (all p<0.05). In fact, these 
results are conservative since we use sub-samples to test the hypotheses rather than creating continuous 
variable interactions with the full sample. Furthermore, using split samples reduces the likelihood of 
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multicollinearity, a common problem when interaction variables are used in regression models.  In fact, the 
VIFs do support this expectation and multicollinearity is not an issue (maximum VIF=2.32). As shown later, 
creating continuous variable interactions in the full sample proved consistent with the sub-sample analysis. 
In summary, the results indicate that the financial marketplace takes a bleak view of the regulatory 
exposure of egregiousness acts of deception and those aimed at consumers. The results also indicate that 
these relationships are more negative for firms with high brand market share. Among the controls, age of drug, 
therapeutic category, and year are not found to be significant. The results for the main effects of advertising, 
market share, and previous citations are also not significant in all models. 
Robustness Checks 
The results discussed so far are robust to alternative models of stock returns, alternative stock 
portfolio-based measures of abnormal returns, time and age effects, heteroskedasticity, and examination of 
risk. We used two other popular models to estimate the abnormal stock returns: CAPM and Fama-French 3-
factor. The CAPM approach is equivalent to the one-factor market model described above, and the Fama-
French 3-factor is similar to the Carhart 4-factor model without the inclusion of momentum. In both cases the 
results were not significantly changed (see Table 4). The omitted variables in the CAPM, however, weakened 
the power of some of our results.  
[Table 4 About Here] 
 We used three alternative benchmark portfolios to calculate the market and abnormal returns: a 
portfolio of firms trading in NASDAQ, a portfolio of firms trading in NYSE, and a portfolio consisting only of 
pharmaceutical firms.   We also calculated equally-weighted and value-weighted versions of abnormal returns.  
The cross-sectional regression analysis, based on these six measures (3 portfolios X 2 types of abnormal 
return calculation), yields results that did not materially change. 
 We also regressed the explanatory variables against the two-day CAR. Table 5 shows that the results 
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remain robust to the operationalization of the dependent variable.  
[Table 5 About Here] 
 In all of these models, we controlled for effects due to time, therapeutic category, and age of the drug. 
We conducted this analysis by including year dummies, therapeutic category dummies, and a continuous 
measure of the time since each drug‟s approval for marketing. Inclusion of these controls did not alter the 
results for the key variables in any significant fashion.  
 To examine if the results were driven by a reduction in the returns or an increase in the risk, we 
explored each firm‟s stock return volatility σ2i over two different windows: the pre-event window (-250,-1) and 
the post event window (0, 250), where “0” represents the event date. Market volatility σ2m was also estimated 
over the same window. Following standard practice in finance (e.g., Schwert 1989), we calculated a volatility 
ratio, defined as, λ = square root of (σ2i/ σ2m). A comparison of the volatility ratio λ over the pre-event and post-
event windows serves as an estimate of the effect of the event on firm volatility. The ratio λ = 0.99 indicates 
that the volatilities, relative to the market, were not different before or after the event. Thus, the event‟s impact 
was not on the firm‟s stock return volatility5.   
DISCUSSION 
Contributions to Research 
Linking marketing actions to financial performance has been named a capital research priority of the 
Marketing Science Institute. The empirical work in marketing on this issue has typically examined the financial 
impact of positive marketing events. Our study extends the limited extant research on the financial value of 
                                                 
5 We also examined if the firm‟s credit ratings (which have been used as a proxy for a firm‟s default risk) changed as a result of the 
FDA citations (Avramov et al. 2009; Anderson and Mansi 2009). Firm credit ratings are determined by rating agencies using 
assessments of probability distributions of future cash flows to bondholders. The data was drawn from S&P Long-Term Domestic 
Issuer Credit rating. The ratings range from a triple AAA rating to a D rating. We used the transformed numerical rating ranging from 
1 for AAA and 22 for a D-rating. We examined the average credit rating the month before the event (posting of the FDA citation 
letter) and compared it to average credit ratings for the firm the month after the event. Simple t-tests indicate no significant change in 
the credit ratings after the event. Taken together, these results suggest that all the effect appears to be on the returns rather than 
risk. 
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negative events by examining deceptive marketing, a phenomenon pervasive in pharmaceuticals as well as in 
other industries. In addition to quantifying the financial market impact of deception, this study identifies a set of 
factors that comprise a substantial proportion of the variation in negative events.  
While it has been thoroughly established that product harm crises and product withdrawals 
significantly impact firm value, the cost of the regulatory exposure of deceptive marketing has not been 
researched. Using the event study methodology, we find that the exposure of certain forms of deceptive 
marketing practices can lead to a significant reduction of firm value. Overall, our analysis shows a noteworthy 
loss of wealth by investors. The average change in excess returns following an FDA citation was 1%. For 
Pfizer, whose market capitalization was $97.91 billion on June 7, 2009, this translates into a wealth loss of 
almost a billion dollars. Compared to positive events, which have typically been explored in the marketing 
literature, the exposure of deceptive marketing has a significantly larger impact. Moreover, our analysis finds 
that firms can be financially punished even for negative marketing events that involve no direct costs to the 
firm. 
The primary goal of this research was to deconstruct these events in order to understand what factors 
can explain the variance in market reaction to exposed acts of deception. Studies in finance and marketing 
involving negative abnormal returns have primarily considered events with high direct costs, such as 
automobile recalls, and have not been able to explain a substantial proportion of the often large indirect costs. 
The few past studies on value-reducing events that have considered the variation in shareholder value 
between events have only included firm characteristics, which are largely found to be insignificant. Our 
analysis has shown that characteristics of the event explain much of the heterogeneity of the impact of 
negative events.  
We found that regulatory exposure of some acts of deception had no impact on firm value and a few 
even boosted share prices. For instance, the net present value of Pfizer saw an increase of $4 million when, in 
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2004, the FDA issued a letter regarding the omission of risk information on the website for its drug Zyrtec. 
However, under certain conditions, we are able to conclude that the cited firms do incur a significant financial 
penalty. In the main effects model, egregiousness of the violation and vulnerability of the target audience had 
significant and negative impacts on market value. As predicted, violations at levels of low egregiousness or 
unconfirmed egregiousness (i.e. unsubstantiated superiority claims) did not reduce estimates of future cash 
flows. As explained by one analyst, “Superiority claims are just about which drug you should buy. . . It makes 
people angry to pay more, but safety concerns carry greater weight.” 
The target audience of the misleading marketing is also critical to the impact of its exposure. The 
results indicate that firms are penalized far more severely when deception is directed at consumers than 
physicians. These results lend support for our argument that firm value is negatively impacted the most by acts 
of deception that target those most vulnerable to deception and that may lead to severe harm.  
The results for type of media are slightly more difficult to interpret. Print media was positively related to 
abnormal returns which may be explained by the low likelihood of these ads to persuade or deceive given the 
highly technical language (Sheehan 2007). Broadcast media was not significantly related to abnormal returns. 
Despite the ability of the emotional appeals commonly used in these advertisements to persuade (Perrone 
2007), the likelihood of deception may be dampened by the perceived untrustworthiness of the medium 
(Macias, Pashupati, and Lewis 2007). The negative results for “other media” are consistent with those of 
Narayannan, Desiraju, and Chintagunta (2004), who find synergies among various marketing investments lead 
to increased ability of a mixed media campaign to persuade. 
Less intuitive, and perhaps the greatest contribution of our study, are the findings regarding the 
moderating effect of brand market share. As expected, brand market share did not have a direct impact on 
abnormal returns. In other words, firms using deceptive advertising for larger share brands were not punished 
overall more than firms using misleading claims for smaller share brands. However, brand market share made 
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a considerable difference in the relationship between the event characteristics and abnormal returns. For 
brands with large market share, egregiousness of violation and target audience explained a large proportion 
(over 40%) of the variation in abnormal returns following a citation. Yet, for brands with low market share, 
these factors explained almost none of the variation. Hence, we can conclude that firms cited for deception 
related to brands with high brand market share are punished more for highly egregious acts or deception 
aimed at vulnerable populations than for acts of deception that are less severe or physician-directed. However, 
firms cited for deception related to brands with low brand market share experience no significant difference in 
impact for acts of high or low egregiousness or by target audience.  
Implications for Managers 
The results of our research will enable Main Street managers and Wall Street executives to make 
more informed decisions about the financial risk of potentially destructive marketing strategies. Our findings 
indicate that Main Street managers need to consider both the target audience and the potential harm when 
communicating with outside stakeholders. Managers will also want to consider how these factors will interact 
with brand market share and advertising spending.  
Although we did not have any ex ante expectations about the impact of advertising spending, a post-
hoc analysis of its moderating role suggests that advertising spending also impacts the relationship between 
some of the event characteristics and abnormal returns (see columns 6 and 7 of Table 3). While the findings 
are more difficult to interpret than those concerning the moderating impact of brand market share, a few 
interesting observations can be made. Brands with high advertising spending (i.e., on average, more visible 
brands) lose more when cited for marketing directed at consumer or claims involving omitted risk information, 
whereas, these characteristics do not influence the relationship between the citation and abnormal stock 
market returns when the brand advertising spending is below the industry average.  
With healthcare and highly technical products, Main Street managers may not be able to guard 
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against misinterpretations that could lead to public harm and, consequently, reduced cash flows for the firm. 
The possibility of such outcomes along with widespread criticism of pharmaceutical advertising has been 
attributed as the motivation for recent announcements by several major pharmaceutical firms, including 
GlaxoSmithKline and Pfizer, that spending on DTC advertising will be reduced significantly (Whalen 2009). On 
the other hand, while managers have to view this result as preliminary evidence, it still seems to imply that 
such acts of deceptive marketing do not put the firm in a double-jeopardy by negatively impacting return and 
risk.  
Implications for Public Policy 
For policymakers who consider how to effectively dissuade firms from utilizing misleading claims, our 
study offers some important insights. We are able to quantify the average financial penalty of different types of 
misleading claims following an FDA citation. Citations for certain acts, such as unsubstantiated superiority 
claims and for the use of print media, may actually boost firm value under some circumstances. In these 
cases, the citations may be encouraging the use of misleading tactics.  
Under other conditions, the financial market heavily penalizes firms for garnering FDA citations. 
Several factors may contribute to the continued prevalence of deceptive practices given the potential for high 
financial losses. One potential cause may be that firms are not aware of the factors associated with high 
penalties and are willing to gamble with deceptive marketing actions. Another reason may be that managers 
believe that they will not be exposed, thus leading to moral hazard. Spending on drug promotion in the U.S. is 
rapidly rising, while the number of citations has been decreasing, the size of the DDMAC staff has stayed 
relatively constant, and the DDMAC budget has been shrinking (Domestic Social Policy Division 2005)(see 
Figures 1 and 2). Additionally, the process of issuing citations has increased in difficulty and length 
(from a few days up to 78 days) (Domestic Social Policy Division 2005). As a result of these factors 
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and despite assurances from the FDA that all pharmaceutical communications are reviewed, firms 
may believe that detection is not certain.  
 [FIGURES 1 and 2 About Here] 
Finally, policymakers need to consider whether the loss of firm value following the publication of a 
citation outweighs the positive boost in sales associated with the misleading message. While calculating the 
overall payoff of using deceptive marketing is beyond the scope of this study, this analysis provides a set of 
factors that should be considered when evaluating the violations that may require additional fines to offset 
gains in sales.  
Limitations and Further Research 
Our study was restricted to a single industry with specific characteristics that make it necessary to use 
caution when generalizing these findings. Although we do not expect that the overall drop in market value will 
be as high for many other industries, we argue the relative degree of impact will be influenced by the factors 
identified in this study. Nevertheless, the magnitude of sales and advertising spending in the pharmaceutical 
industry make the analysis significant in itself. The drugs included in the study represent $95 billion in annual 
sales and $13 billion in advertising spending for the year of their respective citations. The letters were sent to 
firms regarding drugs that, on average, had $426 million in annual sales and represented almost one third of 
all prescriptions in its treatment category.  
Since the focus of our study was the regulatory exposure of deceptive marketing, we cannot claim to 
have examined the full impact of deception. The financial impact of deception also includes any positive gains 
to the firm stemming from the misleading claim from the time it was initially communicated. We did not have 
access to appropriate data nor was this question the focus of our research. However, the issue posses an 
interesting question for future researchers. 
Another limitation of this study is that the sample only included publicly traded firms.  Accordingly, we 
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can say nothing about the impact of deceptive actions for privately held firms.   
While we did rule out the impact of the FDA citations on the short-term risk of the firm (and attributed 
all value reduction to the stock returns), our analysis was rather preliminary. Future research should look at 
alternative risk metrics (e.g., the market, idiosyncratic and aggregate volatility risks faced by firms). 
Our theoretical model considered the estimated impact of future behavior by multiple groups of 
stakeholders, but the method that we used could not separate the value placed on each. An experimental 
study needs to be conducted to distinguish the weight placed by analysts and investors on each group of 
stakeholders and on each type of action (e.g. litigation, lost sales, etc.).  
 Our analysis is also limited to the impact on the cited firm, but prior research indicates that advertising 
can have spillover effects on competitors. An analysis of the impact of regulatory exposure of deception on 
competitors‟ firm value, prescription share, and revenue would illuminate what managers can expect in the 
wake of their competitors‟ marketing missteps.   
33 
 
REFERENCES 
Agrawal, Jagdish and Wagner A. Kamakura (1995), “The Economic Worth of Celebrity Endorser: An Event 
Study Analysis,” Journal of Marketing, 59 (July) 56-62. 
Ahluwalia, Rohini, Robert E. Burnkrant, and H. Rao Unnava (2000), “Consumer Response to Negative 
Publicity: The Moderating Role of Commitment,” Journal of Marketing Research, 37 (May), 203-214. 
Ahmed, Parvez, John Gardella, and Sudhir Nanda (2002), “Wealth Effect of Drug Withdrawals on Firms and 
Their Competitors,” Financial Management, 31 (Autumn), 21-41. 
Aikin, Kathryn (2003), “Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Prescription Drugs: Physician Survey Preliminary 
Results,” (accessed January 15, 2007), [available at www.fda.gov]. 
Anand, Bharat N. and Tarun Khanna (2000), “Do firms learn to create value? The case of alliances,” Strategic 
Management Journal, 21 (March), 295-315. 
Anderson, Eugene W. and Sattar A. Mansi (2009), “Does Customer Satisfaction Matter to Investors? Findings 
from the Bond Market,” Journal of Marketing Research, forthcoming. 
Andrews, J. Craig, Richard G. Netemeyer, and Scot Burton (1998), “Consumer Generalization of Nutrient 
Content Claims in Advertising,” Journal of Marketing, 62 (October), 62-75. 
Angell, Marcia (2004), “Excess in the Pharmaceutical Industry,” Canadian Medical Association Journal, 
171(December), 1451-1453.  
Avramov, Doron, Tarun Chordia, Gergana Jostova and Alexander Philipov (2009), “Dispersion in Analysts‟ 
Earnings Forecasts and Credit Rating,” Journal of Financial Economics, 91 (January), 83-101. 
Bharadwaj, Anandhi S., Sundar G. Bharadwaj and Benn R. Konsynski (1999), “Information Technology Effects 
on Firm Performance as Measured by Tobin‟s Q,” Management Science, 45 (July), 1008-24. 
Bolton, Lisa, Americus Reed, Kevin Volpp and Katrina Armstrong (2008), “How Does Drug and Supplement 
Marketing Affect a Healthy Lifestyle? Journal of Consumer Research, 34 (February), 713-726. 
34 
 
Bronner, Fred and Peter Neijens (2006), “Audience Experiences of Media Context and Embedded 
Advertising,” International Journal of Market Research, 48 (1), 82-100. 
Brown, Stephen J., and Jerold B. Warner (1985), “Using Daily Stock Returns: The Case of Event Studies,” 
Journal of Financial Economics, 14, 3-31. 
Callcott, Margaret F. and Barbara J. Phillips (1996), “Elves Make Good Cookies: Creating Likable Spokes-
Character Advertising,” Journal of Advertising Research, 36 (September/October), 73-9. 
Carhart, Mark M. (1997), “On Persistence of Mutual Fund Performance,” Journal of Finance, 52 (1), 57-82. 
Chan, H.S., J.W. Kensinger, A.J. Keown, and J.D. Martin (1997), "Do Strategic Alliances Create Value," 
Journal of Financial Economics, 46 (2), 199-222. 
Chaney, Paul K., Timothy M. Devinney and Russell S. Winer (1991), “The Impact of New Product Introductions 
of the Market Value,” The Journal of Business, 64 (October), 677-714. 
Clogg, Clifford C., Eva Petkova, and Adamantios Haritou (1995), “Symposium on Applied Regression: 
Statistical Methods for Comparing Regression Coefficients Between Models,” American Journal of Sociology, 
100 (March), 1261-93. 
Colman, Cynthia-Lou, Heather Hartley, and J. David Kennamer (2006), “Examining Claimsmakers‟ Frames in 
News Coverage of Direct-to-Consumer Advertising,” Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly, 83 (3), 
547-562. 
Darke, Peter R., and Robin J. B. Ritchie (2007), “The Defensive Consumer: Advertising Deception, Defensive 
Processing, and Distrust,” Journal of Marketing Research, 44 (February), 113-127.  
Darke, Peter R., Laurence Ashworth, and Robin J.B. Ritchie (2008), “Damage from Corrective Advertising: 
Causes and Cures,” Journal of Marketing. 72 (November), 81-97. 
Darley, William K. and Robert E. Smith (1993), “Advertising Claim Objectivity: Antecedents and Effects,” 
Journal of Marketing, 57 (October), 100-113. 
35 
 
Davidson, Wallace N. III, and Dan L. Worrell (1992), “Research Notes and Communications: The Effect of 
Product Recall Announcements on Shareholder Wealth,” Strategic Management Journal, 13 (6), 467-474. 
Department of Justice (1999), “Multi-State Settlement Against Pharmaceutical Company and BASF,” July 29 
(accessed August 29, 2007), [available at www.doj.state.or.us/releases]. 
Domestic Social Policy Division (2005), Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Prescription Drugs, by Donna U. 
Vogt. Congressional Research Service Report RL32853. 
Donohue, Julie M., Marisa Cevasco, and Meredith B. Rosenthal (2007), “A Decade of Direct-to-Consumer 
Advertising of Prescription Drugs,” The New England Journal of Medicine. 357, 7, 673-681. 
Egan, Mary Ellen (2004), Spin Doctors. Forbes. November 29. 
Fama, Eugene F. (1970), “Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work,” Journal of 
Finance, 25 (2), 383-417. 
--- and Kenneth French (1996), “Multifactor Explanations of Asset Pricing Anomalies,” Journal of Finance, 51 
(1), 2163-85. 
FDA (2005), “Letter to Pfizer,” (accessed September 13, 2007), [available at www.fda.gov/CDER/warn]. 
FDA (2000), “Letter to Janssen,” (accessed September 13, 2007), [available at www.fda.gov/CDER/warn]. 
FDA (2004), “Letter to AstraZeneca,” (accessed September 13, 2007), [available at www.fda.gov/CDER/warn]. 
Fich, Eliezer M. and Anil Shivdasani (2007), “Financial Fraud, Director Reputation, and Shareholder Wealth,” 
Journal of Financial Economics, 86, 306-36. 
Fiske, Susan T. (1980), “Attention and Weight in Person Perception; the Impact of Negative and Extreme 
Behavior,” Journal of Personality and social Psychology, 38 (6), 889-906.  
Gagnon, Marc-Andre and Joel Lexchin (2008), “The Cost of Pushing Pills: A New Estimate of Pharmaceutical 
Promotion Expenditures in the United States,” PLoS Med, 5 (1). 
Gellad, Ziad F. and Kenneth W. Lyles (2007), “Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Pharmaceuticals,” The 
36 
 
American Journal of Medicine, 120, 475-480. 
Geyskens, Inge, Katrijn Gielens, and Marnik G. Dekimpe (2002), “The Market Valuation of Internet Channel 
Additions,” Journal of Marketing, 66 (2), 102-119. 
Gielens, Katrijn, Linda M. Van de Gucht, Jan-Benedict EM Steenkamp and Marnik G. Dekimpe (2008), 
“Dancing with a Giant: The Effect of Wal-Mart‟s Entry into the United kingdom on the Performance of 
European Retailers,” Journal of Marketing Research, 45 (October), 519-34. 
Giliberti, Frank J. (2003), “The Learned Intermediary Doctrine,” Marketing Management, 12 (May/June), 53-5. 
Gönül, Füsun F., Franklin Carter, and Jerry Wind (2000), “What Kind of Patients and Physicians Value Direct-
to-Consumer Advertising of Prescription Drugs,” Health Care Management Science, 3, 215-226. 
Gottlieb, Scott (2007), “The War on (Expensive) Drugs,” The Wall Street Journal. (August 30), A11. 
Graham, David P. and Jeremy C. Vest (2005), “Doctors, Drugs, and Duties to Warn,” Defense Counsel 
Journal. 72 (4), 380-386. 
Harris, Gardiner (2004), “Pfizer to Pay $430 Million Over Promoting Drug To Doctors,” The New York Times, 
May 14. 
Hill, Jaclyn Carole (2005), “The Learned Intermediary Doctrine and Beyond,” Defense Counsel Journal, 72 
(October), 362-79. 
Huh, Jisu and Rita Langteau (2007), “Presumed Influence of DTC Prescription Drug Advertising: Do Experts 
and Novices Think Differently?,” Communication Research, 34 (February), 25-52. 
Jarrell, Gregg and Sam Peltzman (1985), “The Impact of Product Recalls on the Wealth of Sellers,” Journal of 
Political Economy, 93 (3), 512-536. 
Kalaignanam, Kartic, Venkatesh Shankar, and Rajan Varadarajan (2007), “Asymmetric New Product 
Development Alliances: Win-Win or Win-Lose Partnerships?,” Management Science, 53 (March), 357-74.  
Karpoff, Jonathan M., D. Scott Lee, and Gerald S. Martin (2008), “The Cost to Firms of Cooking the Books,” 
37 
 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,43 (September), 581-612. 
Klein, Jill Gabrielle, N. Craig Smith, and Andrew John (2004), “Why We Boycott: Consumer Motivations for 
Boycott Participation,” Journal of Marketing, 68 (July), 92-109. 
Kravitz, Rishard L., Ronald M. Epstein, Mitchell D. Feldman et. al. (2005), “Influence of Patients‟ Requests for 
Direct-to-Consumer Advertised Antidepressants: A Randomized Controlled Trial,” Journal of the American 
Medical Association, 293 (16), 1995-2002. 
Lane, Vicki and Rober Jacobson (1995), “Stock Market Reactions to Brand Extension Announcements: The 
Effects of Brand Attitude and Familiarity,” Journal of Marketing, 59 (1), 63-67. 
Lei, Jing, Niraj Dawar and Jos Lemmik 2008, “Negative Spillover in Brand Portfolios: Exploring the 
Antecedents of Asymmetric Effects,” Journal of Marketing, 72 (May), 111-23. 
Luo, Xueming (2007), “Consumer Negative Voice and Firm-Idiosyncratic Stock Returns,” Journal of Marketing, 
71 (July), 75-88.   
Lyles, Alan (2002), “Direct Marketing of Pharmaceuticals to Consumers,” Annual Review of Public Health, 23, 
73-91. 
Macias, Wendy, Kartik Pashupati, and Lisa Stavchansky Lewis (2007), “A Wonderful Life or Diarrhea and Dry 
Mouth: Policy Issues of Direct-to Consumer Drug Advertising on Television,” Health Communication,22 (3), 
241-52. 
Macilwain, Colin (2005), “Drug Firms Back-Pedal on Direct Advertising,” Nature, 436 (18), 910-911. 
Maguire, Phyllis (1999), “How Direct-to-Consumer Advertising is Putting the Squeeze on Physicians,” 
American college of Physicians-American Society of Internal Medicine Observer, (March), [available at 
www.acponline.org/journals/news]. 
Mahajan, Vijay, Eitan Muller, and Roger Kerin (1984), “Introduction strategy for new Products with Positive and 
Negative Word-of-Mouth,” Management Science, 30 (December), 1389-1415. 
38 
 
Manning, William and Jennifer McKenna (2002), “Lanham Act Also Applies to False Advertising Claims,” The 
National Law Journal.  
Markovitch, Dmitri G., Joel H. Steckel, and Bernard Yeung (2005), “Using Capital Markets as Market 
Intelligence: Evidence From The Pharmaceutical Industry,” Management Science, 51 (October), 1467-1480. 
McWilliams, Abagail and Donald Siegel (1997), “Event Studies in Management Research: Theoretical and 
Empirical Issues,” Academy of Management Journal, 40 (June), 626-57. 
Menon, Ajit M., Aparna D. Deshpande, George M. Zinkhan, and Matthew Perri III (2004), “A Model Assessing 
the Effectiveness of Direct-to-Consumer Advertising: Integration of Concepts and Measures from Marketing 
and Healthcare,” International Journal of Advertising. 23, 91-118. 
Mizik, Natalie and Robert Jacobson (2008), “The Financial Value of Perceptual Brand Attributes,” Journal of 
Marketing Research, 45(February), 15-32.  
_____ and ____(2004), “Are Physicians „Easy Marks‟? Quantifying the Effects of Detailing and Sampling on 
New Prescriptions,” Management Science, 50 (12), 1704-1715.  
Moorman, Christine, Rex Du and Carl F. Mela (2005), “The Effect of Standardized Information on Firm Survival 
and Marketing Strategies,” Marketing Science, 24 (Spring), 263-76. 
Moorthy, Sridhar and Hao Zhao (2000), “Advertising Spending and Perceived Quality,” Marketing Letters, 11 
(August), 221-33. 
Morris, Louis A., David Brinberg, Ron Klimberg, Carole Rivera, and Lloyd G. Millstein (1986), 
“Miscomprehension Rates for Prescription Drug Advertisements,” Current Issues and Research in Advertising, 
9 (1/2), 93-117. 
Narayanan, Sridhar, Ramarao Desiraju, and Pradeep K. Chintagunta (2004), “Return on Investment 
Implications for Pharmaceutical Promotional Expenditures: The Role of Marketing-Mix Interactions,” Journal of 
Marketing, 68 (October), 90-105. 
39 
 
Ortmann, Andreas and Ralph Hertwig (2002), “The Costs of Deeption: Evidence from Psychology,” 
Experimental Economics, 5 (October), 111-31. 
Osinga, Ernst C., P.S.H. Leeflang, Shuba Srinivasan and J.E. Wieringa (2008), “The Effects of Consumer 
Advertising: A Shareholder‟s Perspective with Application to the Pharmaceutical Industry,” Journal of 
Marketing, forthcoming.  
Palmrose, Zoe-Vonna, Vernon J. Richardson, and Susan Scholz (2004), “Determinants of Market Reactions to 
Restatement Announcements,” Journal of Accounting and Economics, 37, 58-89. 
Perreault, William D., Jr. and Laurence E. Leigh (1989), “Reliability of Nominal Data Based on Qualitative 
Judgments,” Journal of Marketing Research, 26 (May), 135-48. 
Perrone, Matthew (2007), “FDA to Study Imapes‟ Impact on Drug Ads,” August 23 (accessed August 23, 
2007), [available at www.ajc.com] 
Roberts, Peter W. and Grahame R. Dowling (2002), “Corporate Reputation and Sustained Superior Financial 
Performance,” Strategic Management Journal, 23 (December), 1077-1093. 
Rubenstein, Sarah and Ron Winslow (2008), “Schering Plough and Merck Defend their Drugs as Stocks 
Suffer,” Wall Street Journal,  B1, April 1, 2008. 
Rust, Roland T., Tim Ambler, Gregory S. Carpenter, V. Kumar, Rajendra K. Srivastava (2004), “Measuring 
Marketing Productivity: Current Knowledge and Future Directions,” Journal of Marketing, 48 (October), 76-89. 
---- and Bruce Cooil (1994), “Reliability Measures for Qualitative Data: Theory and Implications,” Journal of 
Marketing Research, 31 (February), 1-14. 
Schwartz, Victor E., Cary Silverman, Michael J. Hulka, and Christopher E. Appel (2009), “Marketing 
Pharmaceutical Products in the Twenty-First Century: An Analysis of The Continued Viability of Traditional 
Principles of Law in the Age of Direct-to-Consumer Advertising,” Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, 3 
(Winter), 333-388. 
40 
 
Schwert, William G. (1989), “Why Does Stock Market Volatility Change Over Time?,” The Journal of Finance, 
44 (December), 1115-54. 
Sheehan, Kim (2007), “Consumer Friendly or Reader Hostile? An Evaluation of the Readability of DTC Print 
Ads,” Health Marketing Quarterly, forthcoming. 
Sorescu, Alina, Benkatesh Shankar, and Tarun Kushwaha (2007), “New Product Preannouncements and 
Shareholder Value,” Journal of Marketing Research, 44 (August), 468-89. 
Srinivasan, Raji, and Sundar Bharadwaj (2004), “Event Studies in Marketing Strategy Research,” Assessing 
Marketing Strategy Performance, eds. Christine Moorman and Donald Lehmann, 9-28. Cambridge, MA: MSI. 
Srinivasan, Shuba, Koen Pauwels, Jorge Silva-Risso and Dominique M. Hanssens (2009), “Product 
Innovations, Advertising, and Stock Returns,” Journal of Marketing, 73 (January), 24-43. 
---, and Dominique M. Hanssens (2009), “Marketing and Firm Value: Metrics, Methods, Findings, and Future 
Directions,” Journal of Marketing Research, forthcoming. 
Srivastava, Rajendra K., Tasadduq A. Shervani, and Liam Fahey (1998), “Market-Based Assets and 
Shareholder Value: A Framework for Analysis,” Journal of Marketing, 62 (1), 2-18. 
Tellis, Gerard J. and Joseph Johnson (2007), “The Value of Quality,” Marketing Science, 26 (6), 758-773.  
Topol, Eric J. (2004), “Failing the Public Health – Rofecoxib, Merck, and the FDA,” New England Journal of 
Medicine, 351 (17), 1707-1709. 
Tyebjee, Tyzoon T. (1982), “The Role of Publicity in FTC Corrective Advertising Remeddies,” Journal of Public 
Policy & Marketing, 1, 111-121. 
Van Heerde, Harald, Kristiaan Helsen, and Marnik G. Dekimpe (2007), “The Impact of a Product-Harm Crisis 
on Marketing Effectiveness,” Marketing Science, 26 (2), 230-245. 
Wang, Cynthia S., Adam D. Galinsky, and Keith J. Murnighan (2009), “Bad Drives Psychological Reactions, 
But Good Propels Behavior: Response to Honesty and Deception,” Psychological Science, 20 (May), 634-644. 
41 
 
Whalen, Jeanne (2009), “Glaxo to Pare Ads on U.S. Television,” The Wall Street Journal, (January 9).  
Yao, Dennis A. and Christa Van Anh Vecchi (1992), “Information and Decisionmaking at the Federal Trade 
Commission,” Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 11 (Fall), 1-10.  
42 
 
Table 1 
Definitions and Examples of Promotional Violations Cited by the FDA 
 
Violation Definition Example 
Unsubstantiated 
Effectiveness 
Claims  
(a) Representation of a drug as 
more effective than has been 
demonstrated by substantial 
evidence or clinical experience 
(b) Representation of a drug as 
useful in a broader range of 
patients or conditions than has 
been demonstrated by 
substantial evidence or clinical 
experience 
“You present the claim, „It‟s not just for end stage cancer 
anymore!‟ This claim suggests that Duragesic can be used for 
any type of pain management. . . [this claim] is contradictory to 
the boxed warning in the PI. Specifically the PI states, 
„Because serious or life-threatening hypoventilation  could 
occur , Duragesic is contraindicated: in the management of 
acute or post-operative pain‟ . . . Therefore, [this claim] is 
misleading” (FDA 2000) 
Omitted Risk 
Information 
(a) Failure to reveal facts 
material to consequences that 
may result from proper use of 
the drug 
(b) Failure to present 
information on side effects and 
contraindications of a drug with 
a prominence and readability 
reasonably comparable with the 
presentation of effectiveness 
information 
“We are concerned about the section of your ad entitled, „The 
FDA has confidence in the safety and efficacy of Crestor,‟ in 
that it misleading suggests that the Agency does not believe 
that Crestor poses safety concerns. . . There is, however, no 
statement on the website by FDA concluding that „the 
concerns [about Crestor] that have been raised have no 
medical or scientific basis.‟ In fact, recent public statements 
made by the Agency contradict that conclusion” (FDA 2004) 
Unsubstantiated 
Superiority 
Claims 
Representation of a drug as 
more effective or safer than 
another drug when this has not 
been established by substantial 
evidence or clinical experience 
“The [cited] ad features a picture of two people seated on an 
airplane. A man is sneezing and the text next to his picture 
states: „In the right seat. On the wrong allergy medicine.‟ The 
woman in the seat next to him, who is not sneezing, is looking 
at him. The text next to her picture states: „On top of things. 
On Zyrtec.‟ The prominent callout headline below the picture 
states „Tired of your allergy medicine not working? Good thing 
there‟s Zyrtec‟. . . The overwhelming message from the text 
and the visuals of these ads is the comparative claim that 
Zyrtec is more effective in treating allergies in general, or 
certain types of allergies, than some other allergy products. . . 
FDA is not aware of substantial evidence or substantial clinical 
experience demonstrating that Zyrtec is clinically superior to 
any other available OTC and prescription oral allergy 
medicine” (FDA 2005)  
 
Note: Definitions paraphrased from the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act 
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Table 2 
Abnormal Returns for Windows Surrounding the FDA Website Posting 
 
Time Window with 
Day=0 as the Event 
Date 
Mean Abnormal Return (%) 
Based on Carhart Four-
Factor Model 
T-Statistic 
-5 0.18 0.95 
-4 --0.18 -0.98 
-3 0.06 0.35 
-2 -0.22 -1.17 
-1 0.21 1.11 
0 -0.60 -1.97** 
1 --0.41 -1.68* 
2 -0.20 -1.00 
3 -0.11 -0.61 
4 -0.26 -1.40 
5 -0.17 -0.40 
**significant at p<0.05 *significant at p<0.10 
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Table 3 
Results with Net Present Value as Dependent Variable Based on Carhart Four-Factor Model 
Parameters Standardized Estimate (Robust standard error) 
 Model 1  Media Type  Low Market Share  High Market Share  Low Ad Spending High Ad  Spending 
Egregiousness of Omitted Risk Information -0.26(0.13)*** -0.33 (0.11)*** 0.05 (0.12) -0.35 (0.25)*** -0.19(0.15)* -0.52(0.24)*** 
Egregiousness of Unsubstantiated 
Effectiveness Claims 
-0.20  (0.16)** -0.12 (0.15)* -0.05 (0.17) -0.40 (0.37)*** -0.11(0.17) -0.12(0.24) 
Unsubstantiated Superiority Claims -0.06 (0.27) 0.14 (0.26)** -0.08 (0.30) -0.32 (0.46)*** 0.15(0.30) 0.06(0.55) 
DTC -0.27 (0.28)***  0.17 (0.36) -0.19 (0.51)** 0.07(0.49) -0.22(0.52)** 
DTC (Print)  0.13 (0.39)**     
DTC(Other)  -0.65 (0.38)***     
DTC(TV)  -0.06 (0.50)     
Controls:       
Brand Advertising/Sales Ratio 0.13 (0.68) 0.18 (0.60)** -0.02 (0.53) 0.10 (7.69)   
Market share  0.19 (0.003)** -0.07(0.004)   0.09(0.004) 0.15(0.01) 
Firm Letters 0.07  (0.02) 0.30(0.02)*** -0.10 (0.02) 0.37 (0.03)*** 0.24 (0.03) -0.19(0.04) 
F-value (p-level) 4.54 (0.0001) 9.31(0.0001) 0.26 (0.95) 9.18 (0.0001) 2.06 (0.005) 4.34(0.0005) 
R2 (R2 adj) 0.17 (0.13) 0.35 (0.31) 0.02 (0.01) 0.44 (0.39) 0.15 (0.08) 0.30(0.23) 
Maximum VIF 1.52 1.83 1.88 1.71 2.32 1.71 
***p<0.001; **p<0.05 (one-tailed test) 
Note: In addition, the models included twelve category dummies and seven year dummies. They are not shown in the table to save space. 
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Table 4 
Assessing Robustness of Results with Net Present Value as Dependent Variable  
Based on Alternative Models 
 
 Fama-French 3-Factor Model 
DV: Net Present Value 
CAPM Model 
DV: Net Present Value 
 Model 1 Model 2: With 
Media Types  
Model 1 Model 2: With Media 
Types 
 Standardized 
estimate (Robust 
standard error) 
Standardized 
estimate (Robust 
standard error) 
Standardized 
estimate (Robust 
standard error) 
Standardized 
estimate (Robust 
standard error) 
Egregiousness of Omitted Risk 
Information 
-0.25(0.13)*** -0.32 (0.12)*** -0.10 (0.11)* -0.17 (0.11)*** 
Egregiousness of Unsubstantiated 
Effectiveness Claims 
-0.17  (0.16)** -0.12 (0.15)* -0.11 (0.15)* -0.09 (0.14) 
Unsubstantiated Superiority Claims -0.05 (0.29) 0.13 (0.28)* 0.12 (0.27)* 0.24 (0.30)** 
DTC -0.25 (0.28)***  -0.13 (0.25)**  
DTC (Print)  0.11 (0.42)*  0.08 (0.39) 
DTC(Other)  -0.55 (0.38)***  -0.32 90.42)*** 
DTC(TV)  -0.06 (0.49)  -0.10 (0.50)* 
Controls:     
Brand Advertising/Sales Ratio 0.09 (0.65) 0.15 (0.60)** -0.03 (0.60) 0.08 (0.60) 
Market share  0.19 (0.004)** -0.02(0.004) 0.11(0.003) -0.02 (0.004) 
Firm Letters -0.05  (0.02) 0.14(0.02) 0.02 (0.02) 0.13 (0.02) 
Age of the Drug 0.11(0.09) 0.06 (0.09) 0.09 (0.13) 0.13 (0.14) 
F-value (p-level) 3.75 (0.0001) 5.32(0.0001) 9.64 (0.0001) 10.02 (0.0001) 
R2 (R2 adj) 0.41 (0.30) 0.52 (0.42) 0.64 (0.58) 0.67 (0.60) 
***p<0.001; **p<0.05 (one-tailed test) 
Note: In addition, the models included twelve category dummies and seven year dummies. They are not shown in the 
table to save space.
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Table 5 
Assessing Robustness of Results with Two Day CARs as Dependent Variable Based on Alternative Models 
Parameters Standardized estimate (Robust standard error) 
 CAPM Model CAPM Model Fama-French 3-Factor Model Carhart 4-Factor Model 
 Model 1 Model 1 Model 1 Model 2: With Media Types  Model 1 Model 2: With Media Types 
Egregiousness of Omitted Risk Information -0.21 (0.002)** -0.30(0.002)** -0.14 (0.002)* -0.18 (0.002)** -0.16(0.002)* -0.20 (0.002)** 
Egregiousness of Unsubstantiated 
Effectiveness Claims 
-0.26(0.003)** -0.22 (0.003)** -0.29  (0.002)** -0.24 (0.002)*** -0.27 (0.002)*** -0.22 (0.002)** 
Unsubstantiated Superiority Claims -0.08 (0.17) -0.10  (0.17) -0.15 (0.005) -0.05 (0.005) -0.14(0.005) -0.03 (0.005) 
DTC -0.29 (0.04)***  -0.21 (0.004)***  -0.22 (0.004)***  
DTC (Print)  0.08 (0.007)  0.002 (0.008)  0.003 (0.009) 
DTC(Other)  -0.46 (0.006)***  -0.36 (0.007)***  -0.38 (0.007)*** 
DTC(TV)  -0.19 (0.007)*  -0.06 (0.008)  -0.05 (0.008) 
Controls:       
Brand Advertising/Sales  0.21 (0.01)** 0.25 (0.01)* 0.13 (0.01) 0.16 (0.01)* 0.11(0.01) 0.14 (0.01) 
Market share  0.27(0.001)** 0.14 (0.001) 0.29 (0.001)** 0.19 (0.001) 0.30 (0.00)*** 0.18 (0.001) 
Firm Letters 0.11 (0.003) 0.25 (0.003)* -0.04  (0.001) 0.08(0.001) -0.04 (0.004) 0.09 (0.001) 
Age of the Drug 0.06 (0.002) 0.03 (0.001) 0.04 (0.002) 0.01 (0.001) 0.04 (0.001) 0.01 (0.002) 
F-value (p-level) 3.56 (0.0001) 3.98 (0.0001) 2.38 (0.0001) 2.41(0.0005) 2.45 (0.0005) 2.52 (0.0003) 
R2 (R2 adj) 0.43 (0.31) 0.48 (0.36) 0.33 (0.19) 0.35 (0.21) 0.34 (0.20) 0.36 (0.22) 
***p<0.001; **p<0.05 (one-tailed test) 
Note: In addition the models included twelve category dummies and seven year dummies. They are not shown in the table to save space.  
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Figure 1 
Percentage Change in DDMAC Citations Issued and  
Advertising Spending by Pharmaceutical Firms 
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Figure 2 
Total Advertising Spending by Pharmaceutical Firms (in Billions) and  
Total DDMAC Budget to Regulate Drug Marketing (in Millions) 
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APPENDIX 
Criteria for Coding Egregiousness of Violations 
Egregiousness of Violations Concerning Unsubstantiated Effectiveness Claims 
Egregiousness is coded on a scale of 0 to 3 according to the extent of the unsubstantiated claim and the 
potential harm to public safety and health. If more than one promotional material contains a violation in this 
category, the level of egregiousness corresponds to the most severe violation cited. 
0:   No citations 
1:  When the efficacy/indication is stated, but not clearly. Thus, the promotion implies unapproved 
claims .  
2:  When claims are directly made that are unsupported or false BUT the claims do not have life 
threatening or altering consequences 
3:   When claims are directly made that are unsupported or false AND the claims have life 
threatening or altering consequences 
 
Egregiousness of Violations Concerning Omission of Risk Information 
Egregiousness is coded on a scale of 0 to 3 according to the extent of the risk information omitted and the 
potential harm to public safety and health. If more than one promotional material contains a violation in this 
category, the level of egregiousness corresponds to the most severe violation cited. 
0:   No citations 
1:   The risk information is fully divulged, but in an inadequate or unclear manor. 
2:  All or a portion of the risk information is omitted in the promotional material BUT the claims do 
not have life threatening or altering consequences 
3:   All or a portion of the risk information is omitted in the promotional material AND the claims 
have life threatening or altering consequences (“serious” or “significant”) 
 
 
 
 
